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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Political instability is regarded by economists as a serious malaise harmful to economic 
performance. Political instability is likely to shorten policymakers’ horizons leading to sub-
optimal short term macroeconomic policies. It may also lead to a more frequent switch of 
policies, creating volatility and thus, negatively affecting macroeconomic performance. 
Considering its damaging repercussions on economic performance the extent at which political 
instability is pervasive across countries and time is quite surprising. Political instability as 
measured by Cabinet Changes, that is, the number of times in a year in which a new premier is 
named and/or 50 percent or more of the cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers, is indeed 
globally widespread displaying remarkable regional differences (see Figure 1). 
 
The widespread phenomenon of political (and policy) instability in several countries 
across time and its negative effects on their economic performance has arisen the interest of 
several economists. As such, the profession produced an ample literature documenting the 
negative effects of political instability on a wide range of macroeconomic variables including, 
among others, GDP growth, private investment, and inflation. Alesina et al. (1996) use data on 
113 countries from 1950 to 1982 to show that GDP growth is significantly lower in countries 
and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse. In a more recent paper, Jong-a-
Pin (2009) also finds that higher degrees of political instability lead to lower economic growth.1 
As regards to private investment, Alesina and Perotti (1996) show that socio-political instability 
generates an uncertain politico-economic environment, raising risks and reducing investment.2 
Political instability also leads to higher inflation as shown in Aisen and Veiga (2006). Quite 
interestingly, the mechanisms at work to explain inflation in their paper resemble those affecting 
economic growth; namely that political instability shortens the horizons of governments, 
disrupting long term economic policies conducive to a better economic performance.  
 
This paper revisits the relationship between political instability and GDP growth. This is 
because we believe that, so far, the profession was unable to tackle some fundamental questions 
behind the negative relationship between political instability and GDP growth. What are the 
main transmission channels from political instability to economic growth? How quantitatively 
important are the effects of political instability on the main drivers of growth, namely, total 
factor productivity and physical and human capital accumulation? This paper addresses these 
                                                 
1 A dissenting view is presented by Campos and Nugent (2002), who find no evidence of a causal and negative 
long-run relation between political instability and economic growth. They only find evidence of a short-run effect. 
2 Perotti (1996) also finds that socio-political instability adversely affects growth and investment. For a theoretical 
model linking political instability and investment, see Rodrik (1991). 
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important questions providing estimates from panel data regressions using system-GMM3 on a 
dataset of up to 169 countries for the period 1960 to 2004. Our results are strikingly conclusive: 
in line with results previously documented, political instability reduces GDP growth rates 
significantly. An additional cabinet change (a new premier is named and/or 50 percent of 
cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers) reduces the annual real GDP per capita growth rate 
by 2.39 percentage points. This reduction is mainly due to the negative effects of political 
instability on total factor productivity growth, which account for more than half of the effects on 
GDP growth. Political instability also affects growth through physical and human capital 
accumulation, with the former having a slightly larger effect than the latter. These results go a 
long way to clearly understand why political instability is harmful to economic growth. It 
suggests that countries need to address political instability, dealing with its root causes and 
attempting to mitigate its effects on the quality and sustainability of economic policies 
engendering economic growth. 
The paper continues as follows: section II describes the dataset and presents the 
empirical methodology, section III discusses the empirical results, and section IV concludes the 
paper. 
 
II.   DATA AND THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 Annual data on economic, political and institutional variables, from 1960 to 2004 were 
gathered for 209 countries, but missing values for several variables reduce the number of 
countries in the estimations to at most 169. The sources of economic data were the Penn World 
Table Version 6.2 – PWT (Heston et al., 2006), the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) and Global Development Network Growth Database (GDN), and the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). Political and 
institutional data were obtained from the Cross National Time Series Data Archive – CNTS 
(Databanks International, 2007), the Polity IV Database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005), the State 
Failure Task Force database (SFTF), and Gwartney and Lawson (2007). 
The hypothesis that political instability and other political and institutional variables 
affect economic growth is tested by estimating dynamic panel data models for GDP per capita 
growth (taken from the PWT) for consecutive, nonoverlapping, five-year periods, from 1960 to 
2004.4 Our baseline model includes the following explanatory variables (all except Initial GDP 
per capita are averaged over each five-year period): 
                                                 
3 System-GMM is a useful methodology to estimate the effects of political instability on growth since it proposes a 
clear-cut solution to the endogeneity problem involving these two variables. Using natural instruments for 
contemporaneous political instability, this econometric method allows for the calculation of the causal effect of 
political instability on growth independent of the feedback effect of growth on political instability.  
4 The periods are: 1960–64, 1965–69, 1970–74, 1975–79, 1980–84, 1985–89, 1990–94, 1995–99, and 2000–04.  
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 Initial GDP per capita (log) (PWT): log of real GDP per capita lagged by one five-year 
period. A negative coefficient is expected, indicating the existence of conditional 
convergence among countries. 
 Investment (percent of GDP) (PWT). A positive coefficient is expected, as greater 
investment shares have been shown to be positively related with economic growth (Mankiw 
et al., 1992). 
 Primary school enrollment (WDI). Greater enrollment ratios lead to greater human capital, 
which should be positively related to economic growth. A positive coefficient is expected. 
 Population growth (PWT). All else remaining the same, greater population growth leads to 
lower GDP per capita growth. Thus, a negative coefficient is expected. 
 Trade openness (PWT). Assuming that openness to international trade is beneficial to 
economic growth, a positive coefficient is expected. 
 Cabinet changes (CNTS). Number of times in a year in which a new premier is named 
and/or 50 percent of the cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers. This variable is our 
main proxy of political instability. It is essentially an indicator of regime instability, which 
has been found to be associated with lower economic growth (Jong-a-Pin, 2009). A negative 
coefficient is expected, as greater political (regime) instability leads to greater uncertainty 
concerning future economic policies and, consequently, to lower economic growth. 
 
In order to account for the effects of macroeconomic stability on economic growth, two 
additional variables will be added to the model:5 
 Inflation rate (IFS).6 A negative coefficient is expected, as high inflation has been found to 
negatively affect growth. See, among others, Edison et al. (2002) and Elder (2004). 
 Government (percent of GDP) (PWT). An excessively large government is expected to 
crowd out resources from the private sector and be harmful to economic growth. Thus, a 
negative coefficient is expected. 
 
The extended model will also include the following institutional variables:7 
 Index of Economic Freedom (Gwartney and Lawson, 2007). Higher indexes are associated 
with smaller governments (Area 1), stronger legal structure and security of property rights 
(Area 2), access to sound money (Area 3), greater freedom to exchange with foreigners 
                                                 
5 Here, we follow Levine et al. (2000), who accounted for macroeconomic stability in a growth regression by 
including the inflation rate and the size of government. 
6 In order to avoid heteroskedasticity problems resulting from the high variability of inflation rates, Inflation was 
defined as log(1+Inf/100). 
7 There is an extensive literature on the effects of institutions on economic growth. See, among others, Acemoglu et 
al. (2001), Acemoglu et al. (2003), de Hann (2007), Glaeser et al. (2004), and Mauro (1995). 
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(Area 4), and more flexible regulations of credit, labor, and business (Area 5). Since all of 
these are favorable to economic growth, a positive coefficient is expected. 
 Ethnic Homogeneity Index (SFTF): ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating ethnic 
homogeneity, and equals the sum of the squared population fractions of the seven largest 
ethnic groups in a country. For each period, it takes the value of the index in the beginning 
of the respective decade. According to Easterly, et al. (2006), “social cohesion” determines 
the quality of institutions, which has important impacts on whether pro-growth policies are 
implemented or not. Since higher ethnic homogeneity implies greater social cohesion, 
which should result in good institutions and pro-growth policies, a positive coefficient is 
expected.8 
 Polity Scale (Polity IV): from strongly autocratic (-10) to strongly democratic (10). This 
variable is our proxy for democracy. According to Barro (1996) and Tavares and Wacziarg 
(2001), a negative coefficient is expected.9 
Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the tables of results are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. Source 
Growth of GDP per capita 1098 0.016 0.037 -0.344 0.347 PWT 
GDP per capita (log) 1197 8.315 1.158 5.144 11.346 PWT 
Growth of Physical Capital 1082 0.028 0.042 -0.122 0.463 PWT 
Physical Capital per capita (log) 1174 8.563 1.627 4.244 11.718 PWT 
Growth of TFP 703 0.000 0.048 -0.509 0.292 PWT, BL 
TFP (log) 808 8.632 0.763 5.010 12.074 PWT, BL 
Growth of Human Capital 707 0.012 0.012 -0.027 0.080 BL 
Human Capital per capita (log) 812 -0.308 0.393 -1.253 0.597 BL 
Investment (percent of GDP) 1287 14.474 8.948 1.024 91.964 PWT 
Primary School Enrollment 1286 88.509 27.794 3.000 149.240 WDI-WB 
Population Growth 1521 0.097 0.071 -0.281 0.732 PWT 
Trade (percent of GDP) 1287 72.527 45.269 2.015 387.423 PWT 
Government (percent of GDP) 1287 22.164 10.522 2.552 79.566 PWT 
Inflation [=ln(1+Inf/100)] 1080 0.156 0.363 -0.056 4.178 IFS-IMF 
Cabinet Changes 1322 0.044 0.358 0.000 2.750 CNTS 
Regime Instability Index 1 1302 -0.033 0.879 -0.894 8.018 CNTS-PCA
Regime Instability Index 2 1287 -0.014 0.892 -1.058 7.806 CNTS-PCA
                                                 
8 See Benhabib and Rusticini (1996) for a theoretical model relating social conflict and growth. 
9 On the relationship between democracy and growth, see also Acemoglu, et al. (2008). 
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Regime Instability Index 3 1322 -0.038 0.684 -0.813 6.040 CNTS-PCA
Violence Index 1306 -0.004 0.786 -0.435 4.712 CNTS-PCA
Political Instability Index 1302 -0.004 0.887 -0.777 6.557 CNTS-PCA
Index of Economic Freedom 679 5.682 1.208 2.004 8.714 EFW 
Area 2:Legal Structure and 
Security of Property Rights 646 5.424 1.846 1.271 9.363 EFW 
Polity Scale 1194 0.239 7.391 -10.000 10.000 Polity IV 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index 1129 0.583 0.277 0.150 1.000 SFTF 
Sources:  
BL: Updated version of Barro and Lee (2001). 
CNTS: Cross-National Time Series database (Databanks International, 2007).  
CNTS-PCA: Data generated by Principal Components Analysis using variables from CNTS. 
EFW: Economic Freedom of the World (Gwartney and Lawson, 2007). 
IFS-IMF: International Financial Statistics - International Monetary Fund.  
Polity IV: Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). 
PWT: Penn World Table Version 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006).  
SFTF: State Failure Task Force database. 
WDI-WB: World Development Indicators–World Bank.  
Notes: Sample of consecutive, non-overlapping, five-year periods from 1960 to 2004, comprising the 
169 countries considered in the baseline regression, whose results are shown in column 1 of Table 2. 
 
The empirical model for economic growth can be summarized as follows: 
 ittiittiittitiit δPIYYY    WλXβ ''lnlnln ,1,1,  
 iTtNi ,...,1,...,1   (1) 
where Yit stands for the GDP per capita of country i at the end of period t, Xit for a vector of 
economic determinants of economic growth, PIit for a proxy of political instability, and Wit for a 
vector of political and institutional determinants of economic growth; α, β, δ, and λ are the 
parameters and vectors of parameters to be estimated, i are country-specific effects, t are 
period specific effects, and, it is the error term. With   1 , equation (1) becomes: 
 ittiittiittiit δPIYY    WλXβ ''lnln ,1,  
 iTtNi ,...,1,...,1   (2) 
One problem of estimating this dynamic model using OLS is that Yi,t-1 (the lagged 
dependent variable) is endogenous to the fixed effects (νi), which gives rise to “dynamic panel 
bias”. Thus, OLS estimates of this baseline model will be inconsistent, even in the fixed or 
random effects settings, because Yi,t-1 would be correlated with the error term, it, even if the 
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latter is not serially correlated.10 If the number of time periods available (T) were large, the bias 
would become very small and the problem would disappear. But, since our sample has only nine 
non-overlapping five-year periods, the bias may still be important.11 First-differencing Equation 
(2) removes the individual effects (i) and thus eliminates a potential source of bias: 
 ittittiittiit PIδYY    WλXβ ''. ,1,  
 iTtNi ,...,1  ,...,1   (3) 
 But, when variables that are not strictly exogenous are first-differenced, they become 
endogenous, since the first difference will be correlated with the error term. Following  
Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for linear dynamic panel data models that solves this 
problem by instrumenting the differenced predetermined and endogenous variables with their 
available lags in levels: levels of the dependent and endogenous variables, lagged two or more 
periods; levels of the predetermined variables, lagged one or more periods. The exogenous 
variables can be used as their own instruments. 
 A problem of this difference-GMM estimator is that lagged levels are weak instruments 
for first-differences if the series are very persistent (see Blundell and Bond, 1998). According to 
Arellano and Bover (1995), efficiency can be increased by adding the original equation in levels 
to the system, that is, by using the system-GMM estimator. If the first-differences of an 
explanatory variable are not correlated with the individual effects, lagged values of the  
first-differences can be used as instruments in the equation in levels. Lagged differences of the 
dependent variable may also be valid instruments for the levels equations.  
 The estimation of growth models using the difference-GMM estimator for linear panel 
data was introduced by Caselli et al. (1996). Then, Levine et al. (2000) used the system-GMM 
estimator12, which is now common practice in the literature (see Durlauf, et al., 2005, and Beck, 
2008). Although several period lengths have been used, most studies work with nonoverlapping 
five-year periods. 
 
III.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The empirical analysis is divided into two parts. First, we test the hypothesis that 
political instability has negative effects on economic growth, by estimating regressions for GDP 
per capita growth. As described above, the effects of institutional variables will also be 
                                                 
10 See Arellano and Bond (1991) and Baltagi (2008). 
11 According to the simulations performed by Judson and Owen (1999), there is still a bias of 20 percent in the 
coefficient of interest for T=30. 
12 For a detailed discussion on the conditions under which GMM is suitable for estimating growth regressions, see 
Bond et al. (2001). 
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analyzed. Then, the second part of the empirical analysis studies the channels of transmission. 
Concretely, we test the hypothesis that political instability adversely affects output growth by 
reducing the rates of productivity growth and of physical and human capital accumulation. 
 
3.1. Political Instability and Economic Growth 
 The results of system-GMM estimations on real GDP per capita growth using a sample 
comprising 169 countries, and nine consecutive and non-overlapping five-year periods from 
1960 to 2004 are shown in Table 2. Since low economic growth may increase government 
instability (Alesina et al., 1996), our proxy for political instability, Cabinet changes, will be 
treated as endogenous. In fact, most of the other explanatory variables can also be affected by 
economic growth. Thus, it is more appropriate to treat all right-hand side variables as 
endogenous.13  
The results of the estimation of the baseline model are presented in column 1. The 
hypothesis that political instability negatively affects economic growth receives clear empirical 
support. Cabinet Changes is highly statistically significant and has the expected negative sign. 
The estimated coefficient implies that when there is an additional cabinet change per year, the 
annual growth rate decreases by 2.39 percentage points. Most of the results regarding the other 
explanatory variables also conform to our expectations. Initial GDP per capita has a negative 
coefficient, which is consistent with conditional income convergence across countries. 
Investment and enrollment ratios14 have positive and statistically significant coefficients, 
indicating that greater investment and education promote growth. Finally, population growth has 
the expected negative coefficient, and Trade (percent of GDP) has the expected sign, but is not 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 2. Political Instability and Economic Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.0087** -0.0125*** -0.0177*** -0.0181*** -0.0157***
 (-2.513) (-3.738) (-4.043) (-4.110) (-4.307) 
Investment (percent of GDP) 0.0009** 0.0008*** 0.0007** 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 
 (2.185) (2.649) (2.141) (2.908) (3.898) 
Primary School Enrollment 0.0003*** 0.0002* 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 
 (3.097) (1.743) (1.616) (1.134) (0.756) 
Population Growth -0.184*** -0.273*** -0.232*** -0.271*** -0.245*** 
 (-3.412) (-5.048) (-4.123) (-5.266) (-5.056) 
Trade (percent of GDP) 6.70e-05 0.0001** 2.63e-05  -0.00003 
                                                 
13 Their twice lagged values were used as instruments in the first-differenced equations and their once-lagged first-
differences were used in the levels equation. 
14 The results are virtually the same when secondary enrollment is used instead of primary enrollment. Since we 
have more observations for the latter, we opted to include it in the estimations reported in this paper.  
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 (0.957) (2.344) (0.414)  (-0.683) 
Inflation  -0.0091*** -0.0027  -0.0081** 
  (-2.837) (-0.620)  (-2.282) 
Government (percent of GDP)  -8.22e-05 9.72e-06  -0.0004 
  (-0.229) (0.0302)  (-1.366) 
Cabinet Changes -0.0239*** -0.0164** -0.0200** -0.0244*** -0.0158** 
 (-3.698) (-2.338) (-2.523) (-2.645) (-2.185) 
Index of Economic Freedom   0.0109*** 0.0083**  
   (2.824) (2.313)  
Area2: Legal structure and 
security of property rights 
    0.00360* 
    (1.681) 
Number of Observations 990 851 560 588 527 
Number of Countries 169 152 116 120 117 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.229 0.396 0.366 0.128 0.629 
AR1 test (p-value) 1.15e-06 9.73e-05 1.64e-05 2.71e-06 0.00002 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.500 0.365 0.665 0.745 0.491 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: - System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1960–2004. 
- All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two periods were 
used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences 
were used in the levels equation. 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using Windmeijer’s, 
2005, correction).  
- T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1 percent; **, 5 percent, and *, 10 percent. 
 
 The results of an extended model which includes proxies for macroeconomic stability 
are reported in column 2 of Table 2. Most of the results are similar to those of column 1. The 
main difference is that Trade (percent of GDP) is now statistically significant, which is 
consistent with a positive effect of trade openness on growth. Regarding macroeconomic 
stability, inflation and government size have the expected signs, but only the first is statistically 
significant. 
 The Index of Economic Freedom15 is included in the model of column 3 in order to 
account for favorable economic institutions. It is statistically significant and has a positive sign, 
as expected. A one-point increase in that index increases annual economic growth by one 
percentage point. Trade (percent of GDP) and Inflation are no longer statistically significant. 
This is not surprising because the Index of Economic Freedom is composed of five areas, some 
of which are related to explanatory variables included in the model: size of government (Area 
1), access to sound money (Area 3), and greater freedom to exchange with foreigners (Area 4). 
In order to avoid potential collinearity problems, the variables Trade (percent of GDP), 
                                                 
15 Since data for the Index of Economic Freedom is available only from 1970 onwards, the sample is restricted to 
1970 to 2004 when this variable is included in the model. 
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Inflation, and Government (percent of GDP) are not included in the estimation of column 4. The 
results regarding the Index of Economic Freedom and Cabinet Changes remain essentially the 
same.  
An efficient legal structure and secure property rights have been emphasized in the 
literature as crucial factors for encouraging investment and growth (Glaeser, et al., 2004; Hall 
and Jones, 1999; La-Porta, et al., 1997). The results shown in column 5, where the Index of 
Economic Freedom is replaced by its Area 2, Legal structure and security of property rights, are 
consistent with the findings of previous studies.16 
In the estimations whose results are reported in Table 3, we also account for the effects of 
democracy and social cohesion, by including the Polity Scale and the Ethnic Homogeneity Index 
in the model. There is weak evidence that democracy has small adverse effects on growth, as the 
Polity Scale has a negative coefficient, small in absolute value, which is statistically significant 
only in the estimations of columns 1 and 3. These results are consistent with those of Barro 
(1996) and Tavares and Wacziarg (2001)17. As expected, higher ethnic homogeneity (social 
cohesion) is favorable to economic growth, although the index is not statistically significant in 
column 4. The results regarding the effects of political instability, economic freedom, and 
security of property rights are similar to those found in the estimations of Table 2. The most 
important conclusion that we can withdraw from these results is that the evidence regarding the 
negative effects of political instability on growth are robust to the inclusion of institutional 
variables. 
 Considering that political instability is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, eventually not 
well captured by just one variable (Cabinet Changes), we constructed five alternative indexes of 
political instability by applying principal components analysis.18  
                                                 
16 Since Investment (percent of GDP) is included as an explanatory variable, the Area 2 will also affect GDP 
growth through it. Thus, the coefficient reported for Area 2 should be interpreted as the direct effect on growth, 
when controlling for the indirect effect through investment. This direct effect could operate through channels such 
as total factor productivity and human capital accumulation.  
17 Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) justify the negative effect of democracy on growth as the net contribution of 
democracy to lowering income inequality and expanding access of education to the poor (positive) at the expense 
of physical capital accumulation (negative). 
18 This technique for data reduction describes linear combinations of the variables that contain most of the 
information. It analyses the correlation matrix, and the variables are standardized to have mean zero and standard 
deviation of 1 at the outset. Then, for each of the five groups of variables, the first component identified, the linear 
combination with greater explanatory power, was used as the political instability index.  
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Table 3. Political Instability, Institutions, and Economic Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.0216*** -0.0237*** -0.0188*** -0.0182*** 
 (-4.984) (-5.408) (-4.820) (-3.937) 
Investment (percent of GDP) 0.0011*** 0.0006* 0.0018*** 0.0014*** 
 (3.082) (1.773) (5.092) (5.369) 
Primary School Enrollment 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0002* 0.0001 
 (2.106) (2.361) (1.784) (0.853) 
Population Growth -0.255*** -0.195*** -0.228*** -0.215*** 
 (-5.046) (-3.527) (-4.286) (-3.494) 
Trade (percent of GDP) -5.94e-05 1.63e-05 -8.00e-05 -4.16e-05 
 (-1.020) (0.241) (-1.219) (-0.771) 
Inflation  -0.0018  -0.0087*** 
  (-0.373)  (-2.653) 
Government (percent of GDP)  -0.0002  -0.0004* 
  (-0.984)  (-1.655) 
Cabinet Changes -0.0321*** -0.0279*** -0.0302*** -0.0217*** 
 (-3.942) (-3.457) (-4.148) (-3.428) 
Index of Economic Freedom 0.0085** 0.0080**   
 (2.490) (2.255)   
Area2: Legal structure and security of 
property rights 
  0.0040** 0.0033* 
  (2.297) (1.895) 
Polity Scale -0.0006* -4.22e-05 -0.0009* 7.60e-06 
 (-1.906) (-0.105) (-1.864) (0.0202) 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index 0.0449** 0.0560*** 0.0301* 0.0201 
 (2.316) (3.728) (1.671) (1.323) 
Number of Observations 547 520 517 494 
Number of Countries 112 108 113 109 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.684 0.998 0.651 0.992 
AR1 test (p-value) 3.81e-06 2.56e-05 1.10e-05 4.38e-05 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.746 0.618 0.492 0.456 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: - System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1960–2004. 
- All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two periods were 
used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences 
were used in the levels equation. 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using 
Windmeijer’s, 2005, correction).  
- T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1 percent; **, 5 percent, and *, 10 percent. 
 
The first three indexes include variables that are associated with regime instability, the fourth 
has violence indicators, and the fifth combines regime instability and violence indicators. The 
variables (all from the CNTS) used to define each index were: 
o Regime Instability Index 1: Cabinet Changes and Executive Changes. 
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o Regime Instability Index 2: Cabinet Changes, Constitutional Changes, Coups, 
Executive Changes, and Government Crises. 
o Regime Instability Index 3: Cabinet Changes, Constitutional Changes, Coups, 
Executive Changes, Government Crises, Number of Legislative Elections, and 
Fragmentation Index. 
o Violence Index: Assassinations, Coups, and Revolutions. 
o Political Instability Index: Assassinations, Cabinet Changes, Constitutional Changes, 
Coups, and Revolutions. 
 
The results of the estimation of the model of column 1 of Table 3 using the  
above-described indexes are reported in Table 4. While all indexes have the expected negative 
signs, the Violence Index is not statistically significant.19 Thus, we conclude that it is regime 
instability that more adversely affects economic growth. Jong-a-Pin (2009) and Klomp and de 
Haan (2009) reach a similar conclusion. 
 
Table 4. Indexes of Political Instability and Economic Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.0211*** -0.0216*** -0.0221*** -0.0216*** -0.0216***
 (-4.685) (-4.832) (-4.789) (-4.085) (-5.370) 
Investment (percent of GDP) 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0010*** 0.0011*** 
 (3.006) (3.091) (2.778) (3.190) (3.126) 
Primary School Enrollment 0.0003** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0004*** 0.0003** 
 (2.156) (1.964) (1.972) (2.597) (2.496) 
Population Growth -0.245*** -0.214*** -0.221*** -0.226*** -0.220*** 
 (-4.567) (-4.002) (-4.500) (-3.869) (-4.197) 
Trade (percent of GDP) -7.06e-05 -8.92e-05 -8.19e-05 -9.30e-05 -8.95e-05 
 (-1.058) (-1.391) (-1.268) (-1.109) (-1.392) 
Regime Instability Index 1 -0.0198***     
 (-4.851)     
Regime Instability Index 2  -0.0133***    
  (-3.381)    
Regime Instability Index 3   -0.0142***   
   (-4.246)   
Violence Index    -0.0046  
    (-1.197)  
Political Instability Index     -0.0087** 
     (-2.255) 
Index of Economic Freedom 0.0084** 0.0090** 0.0087** 0.0120*** 0.0112*** 
                                                 
19 The results for these five indexes are essentially the same when we include them in other models of Table 3 or in 
the models of Table 2. The same is true for indexes constructed using alternative combinations of the CNTS 
variables. These results are not shown here, but are available from the authors upon request.  
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 (2.251) (2.429) (2.251) (2.935) (3.324) 
Polity Scale -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0010** -0.0008** 
 (-1.356) (-1.311) (-0.833) (-2.296) (-2.060) 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index 0.0497*** 0.0497*** 0.0530*** 0.0429* 0.0376** 
 (3.150) (3.094) (3.177) (1.832) (2.349) 
Number of Observations 547 547 545 547 547 
Number of Countries 112 112 111 112 112 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.560 0.432 0.484 0.576 0.516 
AR1 test (p-value) 3.82e-06 3.22e-06 3.60e-06 6.63e-06 3.80e-06 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.667 0.291 0.437 0.280 0.233 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: - System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1960–2004; 
- All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two periods were 
used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences 
were used in the levels equation; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using 
Windmeijer’s, 2005, correction).  
- T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1 percent; **, 5 percent, and *, 10 percent. 
 
 Several robustness tests were performed in order to check if the empirical support found 
for the adverse effects of political instability on economic growth remains when using restricted 
samples or alternative period lengths. Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients and t-statistics 
obtained for the proxies of political instability when the models of column 1 of Table 3 (for 
Cabinet Changes) and of columns 1 to 3 of Table 4 (for the three regime instability indexes) are 
estimated using seven alternative restricted samples.20 The first restricted sample (column 1 of 
Table 5) includes only developing countries, and the next four (columns 2 to 5) exclude one 
continent at a time.21 Finally, in the estimation of column 6, data for the 1960s and the 1970s is 
excluded from the sample, while in column 7 the last five-year period (2000–04) is excluded. 
Since Cabinet Changes and the three regime instability indexes are always statistically 
significant, we conclude that the negative effects of political instability on real GDP per capita 
growth are robust to sample restrictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The complete results of the 28 estimations of Table 5 and of the 16 estimations of Table 6 are available from the 
authors upon request. 
21 The proxies of political instability were interacted with regional dummy variables in order to test for regional 
differences in the effects of political instability on growth. No evidence of such differences was found. 
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Table 5. Robustness Tests for Restricted Samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Proxy of 
Political 
Instability 
Excluding 
Industrial 
Countries 
Excluding 
Africa 
Excluding 
Developing
Asia 
Excluding 
Developing 
Europe 
Excluding 
Latin America 
Excluding 
the 1960s 
and 1970s
Excluding 
the 2000s 
Cabinet 
Changes 
-0.0282*** -0.0285*** -0.0342*** -0.0280*** -0.0282*** -0.0309*** -0.0326***
 (-3.814) (-4.588) (-3.583) (-3.315) (-3.563) (-3.108) (-3.693) 
        
Regime 
Instability 
Index 1 
-0.0191*** -0.0154*** -0.0198*** -0.0185*** -0.0167*** -0.0159*** -0.0136***
 (-3.795) (-4.157) (-3.128) (-3.686) (-3.534) (-3.326) (-3.325) 
        
Regime 
Instability 
Index 2 
-0.0161*** -0.0107*** -0.0141*** -0.0131*** -0.0117** -0.0160*** -0.0141***
 (-3.299) (-3.905) (-3.717) (-3.112) (-2.553) (-3.292) (-3.540) 
        
Regime 
Instability 
Index 3 
-0.0161*** -0.0118*** -0.0148*** -0.0145*** -0.0096*** -0.0165*** -0.0146***
 (-3.686) (-3.459) (-3.563) (-3.369) (-2.760) (-3.633) (-3.587) 
Number of 
Observations 
415 401 471 506 436 441 488 
Number of 
Countries 
92 80 97 97 91 111 112 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: -     System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1960–2004. 
- The dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita. 
- Each coefficient shown comes from a separate regression. That is, this table 
summarizes the results of 28 estimations. The complete results are available from 
the authors upon request. 
- The explanatory variables used, besides the proxy for political instability indicated 
in each row, are those of the model of column 1 of Table 3 (for Cabinet Changes) 
and columns 1 to 3 of Table 4 (for the regime instability indexes). 
- All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two 
periods were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once 
lagged first-differences were used in the levels equation. 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using 
Windmeijer’s, 2005, correction).  
16 
 
 
- T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1 percent; **, 5 percent, and *, 10 percent. 
 
 The results of robustness tests for alternative period lengths are reported in Table 6. The 
models of column 1 of Table 3 (for Cabinet Changes) and of columns 1 to 3 of Table 4 (for the 
three regime instability indexes) were estimated using consecutive, non-overlapping periods of 
4, 6, 8 and 10 years. Again, all estimated coefficients are statistically significant, with a negative 
sign, providing further empirical support for the hypothesis that political instability adversely 
affects economic growth. 
 
Table 6. Robustness Tests for Alternative Period Lengths 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proxy of Political Instability 4-Year  
Periods 
6-Year  
Periods 
8-Year 
Periods 
10-Year 
Periods 
Cabinet Changes -0.0298* -0.0229** -0.0121* -0.0231** 
 (-1.683) (-2.470) (-1.752) (-2.004) 
     
Regime Instability Index 1 -0.0081* -0.0121*** -0.0065* -0.0213** 
 (-1.744) (-2.842) (-1.840) (-2.553) 
     
Regime Instability Index 2 -0.0077** -0.0081** -0.0092** -0.0078*** 
 (-2.451) (-2.291) (-2.170) (-2.590) 
     
Regime Instability Index 3 -0.0065** -0.0076** -0.0101** -0.0069** 
 (-2.150) (-2.217) (-2.462) (-2.133) 
Number of Observations 737 488 390 506 
Number of Countries 112 110 109 97 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: - System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1960–2004. 
- The dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita. 
- Each coefficient shown comes from a separate regression. That is, this table summarizes 
the results of 16 estimations. The complete results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
- The explanatory variables used, besides the proxy for political instability indicated in 
each row, are those of the model of column 1 of Table 3 (for Cabinet Changes) and 
columns 1 to 3 of Table 4 (for the regime instability indexes). 
- All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two periods 
were used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-
differences were used in the levels equation. 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using 
Windmeijer’s, 2005, correction).  
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- T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: 
***, 1 percent; **, 5 percent, and *, 10 percent. 
 
3.2. Channels of Transmission 
In this section, we study the channels through which political instability affects 
economic growth. Since political instability is associated with greater uncertainty regarding 
future economic policy, it is likely to adversely affect investment and, consequently, physical 
capital accumulation. In fact, several studies have identified a negative relation between 
political instability and investment (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Mauro, 1985; Özler and Rodrik, 
1992; Perotti, 1996). Instead of estimating an investment equation, we will construct the series 
on the stock of physical capital, using the perpetual inventory method, and estimate equations 
for the growth of the capital stock. That is, we will analyze the effects of political instability and 
institutions on physical capital accumulation. 
It is also possible that political instability adversely affects productivity. By increasing 
uncertainty about the future, it may lead to less efficient resource allocation. Additionally, it 
may reduce research and development efforts by firms and governments, leading to slower 
technological progress. Violence, civil unrest, and strikes, can also interfere with the normal 
operation of firms and markets, reduce hours worked, and even lead to the destruction of some 
installed productive capacity. Thus, we hypothesize that higher political instability is associated 
with lower productivity growth. Finally, human capital accumulation may also be adversely 
affected by political instability because uncertainty about the future may induce people to invest 
less in education. 
 
Construction of the series 
The series were constructed following the Hall and Jones (1999) approach to the 
decomposition of output. They assume that output, Y, is produced according to the following 
production function: 
   αα AHKY  1  (4) 
where K denotes the stock of physical capital, A is a labor-augmenting measure of productivity, 
and H is the amount of human capital-augmented labor used in production. Finally, the factor 
share α is assumed to be constant across countries and equal to 1/3. 
The series on the stock of physical capital, K, were constructed using the perpetual 
inventory equation: 
   11  ttt KIK   (5) 
where It is real aggregate investment in PPP at time t, and  is the depreciation rate (assumed to 
be 6%). Following standard practice, the initial capital stock, K0, is given by: 
  g
I
K 00  (6) 
18 
 
 
where I0 is the value of investment in 1950 (or in the first year available, if after 1950), and g is 
the average geometric growth rate for the investment series between 1950 and 1960 (or during 
the first 10 years of available data).  
The amount of human capital-augmented labor used in production, Hi, is given by: 
   isi LeH i  (7) 
where si is average years of schooling in the population over 25 years old (taken from the most 
recent update of Barro and Lee, 2001), and the function (si) is piecewise linear with slope 
0.134 for si4, 0.101 for 4<si8, and 0.068 for si>8. Li is the number of workers (labor force in 
use).  
With data on output, the physical capital stock, human capital-augmented labor used, 
and the factor share, the series of total factor productivity (TFP), Ai, can be easily constructed 
using the production function (4).22 As in Hsieh and Klenow (2010), after dividing equation (4) 
by population N, and rearranging, we get a conventional expression for growth accounting. 
 
αα
N
HA
N
K
N
Y 




1
 (8) 
This can also be expressed as: 
   αα Ahky  1  (9) 
where y is real GDP per capita, k denotes the stock of physical capital per capita, A is TFP, and 
h is the amount of human capital per capita.  
The individual contributions to GDP per capita growth from physical and human capital 
accumulation and TFP growth can be computed by expressing equation (9) in rates of growth: 
     hAky   11
 (10) 
Empirical results 
 Table 7 reports the results of estimations in which the growth rate of physical capital per 
capita is the dependent variable,23 using a similar set of explanatory variables as for GDP per 
                                                 
22 See Caselli (2005) for a more detailed explanation of how the series are constructed. We also follow this study in 
assuming that the depreciation rate of physical capital is 6 percent and that the factor share α is equal to 1/3. The 
series of output, investment and labor are computed as follows (using data from the PWT 6.2):  
Y = rgdpch*(pop*1000), I = (ki/100)*rgdpl*(pop*1000) , L = rgdpch*(pop*1000)/rgdpwok. Population is 
multiplied by 1000 because the variable pop of PWT 6.2 is scaled in thousands.  
23 A second lag of physical capital had to be included in the right hand-side in order to avoid second order 
autocorrelation of the residuals. Although the coefficient for the first lag is positive, the second lag has a negative 
coefficient, higher in absolute value. Thus, when we add up the two coefficients for the lags of physical capital, we 
(continued…) 
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capita growth.24 Again, Cabinet Changes and the three regime instability indexes are always 
statistically significant, with a negative sign. Thus, we find strong support for the hypothesis 
that political instability adversely affects physical capital accumulation. Since the accumulation 
of capital is done through investment, our results are consistent with those of previous studies 
which find that political instability adversely affects investment (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; 
Özler and Rodrik, 1992). There is some evidence that economic freedom is favorable to capital 
accumulation (column 2), but democracy and ethnic homogeneity do not seem to significantly 
affect it.25 
 
Table 7. Political Instability and Physical Capital Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log Physical Capital 0.1000*** 0.0716*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.102***
per capita (-1) (8.963) (6.065) (6.316) (7.139) (7.833) 
Log Physical Capital -0.109*** -0.0846*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.103***
per capita (-2) (-9.438) (-7.860) (-6.159) (-6.973) (-7.642) 
Primary School Enrollment 0.0001 0.00003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.764) (0.292) (-0.855) (-0.997) (-1.189) 
Population Growth -0.299*** -0.272*** -0.212** -0.216*** -0.192** 
 (-5.591) (-5.730) (-2.442) (-2.700) (-2.474) 
Trade (percent of GDP) 0.0001** 0.00005 0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 
 (2.427) (1.169) (0.234) (0.230) (0.386) 
Cabinet Changes -0.0235*** -0.0195***    
 (-2.968) (-2.969)    
Regime Instability Index 1   -0.0108**   
   (-2.180)   
Regime Instability Index 2    -0.00932**  
    (-2.487)  
Regime Instability Index 3     -0.00906**
     (-2.325) 
Index of Economic Freedom  0.0070** 0.0015 0.0010 0.0004 
  (2.473) (0.395) (0.282) (0.130) 
Polity Scale  -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 
                                                                                                                                                            
get negative values whose magnitude is in line with those obtained for lagged GDP per capita in the previous 
tables. 
24 Since the variable Investment (percent of GDP) – variable ki from the PWT 6.2 - was used to construct the series 
of the stock of physical capital, it was not included as an explanatory variable. Nevertheless, the results for political 
instability do not change when the investment ratio is included. 
25 In order to account for interactions among the three transmission channels, we included the growth rates of TFP 
and of human capital as explanatory variables. None was statistically significant, regardless of the use of current or 
lagged growth rates. In fact, the same happened in the estimations for the other channels. That is, the growth rate of 
one transmission channel does not seem to be affected by the growth rates of the other two channels. These results 
are not shown here in order to economize space, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
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  (-0.414) (-1.117) (-1.151) (-0.940) 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index  0.0343* 0.0010 0.0009 0.0019 
  (1.825) (0.0558) (0.0414) (0.0917) 
Number of Observations 899 531 531 531 529 
Number of Countries 155 108 108 108 107 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.0535 0.553 0.195 0.426 0.213 
AR1 test (p-value) 0.0000009 0.00002 0.0001 0.0002 0.00006 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.182 0.905 0.987 0.987 0.928 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: - System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1960–2004. 
- All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two periods were 
used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences 
were used in the levels equation. 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using 
Windmeijer’s, 2005, correction).  
- T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1 percent; **, 5 percent, and *, 10 percent. 
 
 The next step of the empirical analysis was to analyze another possible channel of 
transmission, productivity growth. The results reported in Table 8 provide clear empirical 
support for the hypothesis that political instability adversely affects productivity growth, as 
Cabinet Changes is always statistically significant, with a negative sign.26 Economic freedom, 
which had positive effects on GDP growth, is also favorable to TFP growth. As can be seen in 
columns 3 to 5, we find clear evidence that regime instability adversely affects TFP growth. 
Thus, we can conclude that an additional channel through which political instability negatively 
affects GDP growth is productivity growth.  
  
Table 8. Political Instability and TFP Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Initial TFP (log) -0.0338*** -0.0344*** -0.0299*** -0.0308** -0.0301** 
 (-2.871) (-3.576) (-2.796) (-2.525) (-2.540) 
Population Growth -0.298*** -0.149 -0.202* -0.189 -0.156 
 (-3.192) (-1.639) (-1.837) (-1.367) (-1.150) 
Trade (percent of GDP) 0.00007 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.640) (-1.375) (-1.632) (-1.626) (-1.312) 
Cabinet Changes -0.0860*** -0.0243*    
 (-2.986) (-1.685)    
                                                 
26 Data on investment and human capital were used to construct the TFP series. Thus, the variables Investment 
(percent of GDP) and Primary School Enrollment were not included as explanatory variables in the estimations for 
TFP growth reported in Table 8. But, when they are included, the results for the other explanatory variables do not 
change significantly.  
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Regime Instability Index 1   -0.0129**   
   (-1.995)   
Regime Instability Index 2    -0.0084*  
    (-1.700)  
Regime Instability Index 3     -0.0096** 
     (-1.976) 
Index of Economic Freedom  0.0190*** 0.0225** 0.0225** 0.0197** 
  (2.794) (2.380) (2.399) (2.340) 
Polity Scale  -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0004 
  (-1.062) (-1.354) (-1.099) (-0.592) 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index  0.0385* 0.0126 0.0216 0.0237 
  (1.647) (0.513) (0.914) (1.101) 
Number of Observations 700 502 502 502 498 
Number of Countries 105 91 91 91 91 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.501 0.614 0.472 0.253 0.242 
AR1 test (p-value) 0.0064 0.00004 0.00004 0.00005 0.00005 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.677 0.898 0.907 0.823 0.811 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: - System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1960–2004. 
- All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two periods were 
used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences 
were used in the levels equation. 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using 
Windmeijer’s, 2005, correction).  
- T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1 percent; **, 5 percent, and *, 10 percent. 
 
Finally, Table 9 reports the results obtained for human capital growth.27 Again, Cabinet 
Changes and the regime instability indexes are always statistically significant, with the expected 
negative signs. Regarding the institutional variables, democracy seems to positively affect 
human capital growth, as the Polity Scale is statistically significant, with a positive sign, in 
columns 3 to 5. There is also weak evidence in column 4 that ethnic homogeneity is favorable to 
human capital accumulation. Finally, openness to trade has positive effects on human capital 
accumulation. 
 
Table 9. Political Instability and Human Capital Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
                                                 
27 Since data on education was used to construct the series of the stock of human capital, Primary School 
Enrollment was not included as an explanatory variable in the estimations of Table 9. If included, it is statistically 
significant, with a positive sign, and results regarding the effects of political instability remain practically 
unchanged. 
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Initial Human Capital  
per capita (log) 
-0.00608 -0.0129** -0.0122** -0.0106 -0.0121 
(-1.313) (-2.146) (-2.214) (-1.592) (-1.604) 
Investment (percent of GDP) -0.0001 0.0002 0.000146 0.000190 0.0002 
 (-0.723) (1.093) (0.744) (0.876) (1.074) 
Population Growth -0.0608*** -0.0369 -0.0280 -0.0160 -0.0271 
 (-2.772) (-1.640) (-1.161) (-0.676) (-1.210) 
Trade (percent of GDP) 0.00009** 0.00006* 0.0000721**0.0000697** 0.00006* 
 (2.488) (1.868) (2.081) (1.976) (1.836) 
Cabinet Changes -0.0113** -0.00911**    
 (-1.976) (-2.035)    
Regime Instability Index 1   -0.00379**   
   (-2.093)   
Regime Instability Index 2    -0.00311**  
    (-2.152)  
Regime Instability Index 3     -0.00292* 
     (-1.847) 
Index of Economic Freedom  -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0020 
  (-1.263) (-0.951) (-1.171) (-1.400) 
Polity Scale  0.0002 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 
  (1.490) (3.217) (3.198) (3.170) 
Ethnic Homogeneity Index  0.0103 0.0098 0.00998* 0.0101 
  (1.638) (1.220) (1.675) (1.515) 
Number of Observations 704 504 504 504 500 
Number of Countries 105 91 91 91 91 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.406 0.699 0.672 0.703 0.678 
AR1 test (p-value) 0.0000001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 0.00003 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.718 0.581 0.525 0.623 0.675 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: - System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1960–2004. 
- All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values two periods were 
used as instruments in the first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences 
were used in the levels equation. 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using 
Windmeijer’s, 2005, correction).  
- T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1 percent; **, 5 percent, and *, 10 percent. 
 
Effects of the three transmission channels 
 The last step of the empirical analysis was to compute the effects of political instability 
on GDP per capita growth through each of the three transmission channels, using equation (10). 
The results of this growth decomposition exercise are reported in Table 10, which shows, for 
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each proxy of political instability, the estimated coefficients,28 the effects on GDP per capita 
growth, and the percentage contributions to the total effects. 
More than half of the total negative effects of political instability on real GDP per capita 
growth seem to operate through its adverse effects on total factor productivity (TFP) growth, as 
this channel is responsible for 52.13 percent to 58.40 percent of the total effects. Thus, 
according to our results, TFP growth is the main transmission channel through which political 
instability affects real GDP per capita growth. Regarding the other channels, physical capital 
accumulation accounts for 22.59 percent to 28.71 percent of the total effect, while the growth of 
human capital accounts for 17.08 percent to 21.11 percent. This distribution of the effects of 
political instability on GDP growth through the three channels is not surprising. According to 
the literature on growth accounting, human capital accounts for 10–30 percent of country 
income differences, physical capital accounts for about 20 percent, and the residual TFP 
accounts for 60–70 percent (see Hsieh and Klenow, 2010). 
 
Table 10. Transmission Channels of Political Instability into GDP Growth 
Proxy of 
Political 
Instability 
 Channels of Transmission 
 Growth of 
Physical 
Capital pc 
Growth of 
TFP 
Growth of 
Human 
Capital pc 
Total Effect of the 3 
Channels on the 
Growth of GDP pc
Cabinet 
Changes 
Coefficient -0.0195*** -0.0243* -0.00911**  
 Effect on GDP -0.0065 -0.0162 -0.0061 -0.0288 
 Percent of Total 
Effect 22.59% 56.30% 21.11% 
100% 
      
Regime 
Instability 
Index 1 
Coefficient -0.0108** -0.0129** -0.00379**  
 Effect on GDP -0.0036 -0.0086 -0.0025 -0.0147 
 Percent of Total 
Effect 24.44% 58.40% 17.16% 
100% 
      
Regime 
Instability 
Index 2 
Coefficient -0.00932** -0.00846* -0.00311**  
 Effect on GDP -0.0031 -0.0056 -0.0021 -0.0108 
 Percent of Total 
Effect 28.71% 52.13% 19.16% 
100% 
                                                 
28 The coefficients for the proxies of political instability are those reported in columns 2 to 5 of Table 7 (Growth of 
Physical Capital per capita), Table 8 (Growth of TFP), and Table 9 (Growth of Human Capital per capita). 
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Regime 
Instability 
Index 3 
 
Coefficient 
 
-0.00906** 
 
-0.00964** 
 
-0.00292* 
 
 Effect on GDP -0.0030 -0.0064 -0.0019 -0.0114 
 Percent of Total 
Effect 26.51% 56.41% 17.08% 
100% 
Sources: See Table 1 
 
Notes: -      The estimated coefficients were taken from: columns 2 to 5 of Table 7, for the  
  Growth of Physical Capital per capita; columns 2 to 5 of Table 8, for the Growth of    
 TFP; and, columns 2 to 5 of Table 9, for the Growth of Human Capital per capita. 
- The effects of each channel on the growth of real GDP per capita are obtained by 
multiplying: the coefficient obtained for the growth of Physical Capital per capita by 
=1/3; the coefficient obtained for the growth of TFP by (1-)=2/3; and, the 
coefficient obtained for the growth of Human Capital per capita by  
(1-)=2/3. That is, we apply equation (10):     hαAαkαy  11 . 
 
Although the total effects of political instability reported in the last column of Table  
10 are somewhat smaller than those obtained for the proxies of political instability in the 
estimations of column 1 of Table 3 (for Cabinet Changes) and of columns 1 to 3 of Table 4 (for 
the three regime instability indexes), Wald tests never reject the hypothesis that the coefficient 
estimated for GDP per capita growth is equal to the total effect reported in Table 10.29 
 
IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
 This paper analyzes the effects of political instability on growth. In line with the 
literature, we find that political instability significantly reduces economic growth, both 
statistically and economically. But, we go beyond the current state of the literature by 
quantitatively determining the importance of the transmission channels of political instability to 
economic growth. Using a dataset covering up to 169 countries in the period between 1960 and 
2004, estimates from system-GMM regressions show that political instability is particularly 
                                                 
29 For example, the estimated coefficient for Cabinet Changes in column 1 of Table 3 is -0.0321, while the total 
effect of the three channels reported in the last column of Table 10 is -0.0288. The results of the Wald tests were: 
H0: Cabinet Changes (Table 3, Col. 1) = -0.0288  chi2(1) = 0.17 Prob>chi2 = 0.6841 
H0: Regime Inst. Index 1 (Table 4, Col. 1) = -0.0147 chi2(1) = 1.57 Prob>chi2 = 0.2106 
H0: Regime Inst. Index 2(Table 4, Col. 2) = -0.0108 chi2(1) = 0.40 Prob>chi2 = 0.5289 
H0: Regime Inst. Index 3 (Table 4, Col. 3) = -0.0114 chi2(1) = 0.71 Prob>chi2 = 0.3973 
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harmful through its adverse effects on total factor productivity growth and, in a lesser scale, by 
discouraging physical and human capital accumulation. By identifying and quantitatively 
determining the main channels of transmission from political instability to economic growth, 
this paper contributes to a better understanding on how politics affects economic performance. 
 Our results suggest that governments in politically fragmented countries with high 
degrees of political instability need to address its root causes and try to mitigate its effects on the 
design and implementation of economic policies. Only then, countries could have durable 
economic policies that may engender higher economic growth. 
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Figure 1. Political Instability Across the World 
 
Source: CNTS (Databanks International, 2007). 
Notes:  - Five-year averages of the variable Cabinet Changes computed using a sample of yearly data 
for 209 countries. 
- Cabinet Changes is defined as the number of times in a year in which a new premier is named 
and/or 50 percent of the cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers. 
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